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AT&TMOBILITYL.L.C. V. CoNcEPcIoN: THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FAA
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1984 with Southland Corp. v. Keating,' the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 2 that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)3 preempts state laws invalidating arbitration agreements.
Most recently, the Court held in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion4
that California law "classifying most collective arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts as unconscionable" was preempted by Section 2 of
the FAA.'
Section 2, the "primary substantive provision of the Act,"' outlines
both the general rule for the treatment of arbitration clauses as well as the
exception to the rule:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.7
The Court has construed the language of the FAA's saving clause-
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract"-to allow the invalidation of arbitration agreements by
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability."' This interpretation of the saving clause, coupled
with the Court's general presumption against federal preemption of state
1. 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
2. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding
that California's rule classifying most collective arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as uncon-
scionable was preempted by the FAA); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688
(1996) (holding that a Montana statute, which conditioned the enforceability of arbitration clauses on
their compliance with a special notice requirement, was preempted by the FAA); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1987) (holding that the provision of California Labor Law, which stated that
wage collection actions may be maintained without regard to any private agreement to arbitrate, was
preempted by the FAA); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that the California Franchise In-
vestment Law was preempted by the FAA).
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). Because this Comment focuses upon the preemption of state
laws, it refers only to sections contained in Chapter I of the FAA, which focuses principally on
domestic arbitration. However, the full FAA includes additional chapters and sections. See id. (
201-208,301-307.
4. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
5. Id. at 1746, 1753.
6. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
8. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (interpreting the saving clause of 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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laws,9 might lead observers to expect not only a liberal application of this
saving clause, but a distinct proclivity of the Court to uphold state laws
against challenges under the FAA. However, in practice, the Court has
"routinely" held that the FAA preempts state laws invalidating arbitra-
tion agreements. o
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of the history
and case law pertaining to FAA preemption. Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions in Concepcion. Part III describes the
inherent conflict in the Concepcion Court's decision. In addition, Part III
examines the practical implications of the Concepcion decision and the
means by which the Supreme Court or Congress could bring this deci-
sion into closer alignment with federalist principles. This Comment con-
cludes by noting that although the holding in Concepcion represents a
steadfast adherence to the line of jurisprudence preempting state laws
under the FAA, these collective decisions deviate from and conflict with
the principles inherent in the preemption doctrine and federalism.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Preemption Doctrine
The doctrine of preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution," which states that federal law is the "su-
preme Law of the Land." 2 The Supreme Court has articulated the gen-
eral concept of preemption as recognizing that "under the Supremacy
Clause,. . . any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged
power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield."' 3
The preemption doctrine can be divided into two primary catego-
ries: express preemption and implied preemption.14 Although all preemp-
tion cases require the court to make a determination about the congres-
sional intent of the federal statute, express and implied preemption differ
in how this determination is made.15 Express preemption involves the
interpretation of statutes that include an express provision dictating that
the federal legislation preempts state laws. However, even without such
9. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 398
(2004) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
10. Id. at 393-94 & n.2.
II. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); see also
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397. But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 767, 770-77 (1994) (asserting that the prevailing view that preemption and su-
premacy are either identical or inherently connected is incorrect and that they represent two distinct
legal concepts).
12. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
13. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress Over State
Courts, 83 OR. L. REv. 541, 547 (2004).
15. Id
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an express preemption clause, the court may nonetheless determine that a
state law is impliedly preempted by federal legislation.' 6 This implied
preemption requires a determination of Congress's preemptive intent
based on other statutory provisions, legislative history, or both.' 7 Implied
preemption is further subdivided into field preemption and conflict
preemption.'8 Field preemption exists when the Court finds, within fed-
eral legislation, a clear congressional intent that federal law should ex-
clusively occupy a field.'9 The Supreme Court has inferred the requisite
congressional intent to create this type of preemption in cases where the
federal statutory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." 2 0
Conflict preemption arises when a state law actually conflicts with the
federal law.2 1 There are two situations in which courts may find conflict
preemption 22: first, where the federal and state laws are mutually exclu-
sive, such that a party would be unable to simultaneously comply with
both laws, 23 and second, where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 24 The former category of conflict preemption is also referred
to as "impossibility preemption,"25 while the latter is typically referred to
as "obstacle preemption." 2 6 Obstacle preemption is the most frequent
category of implied preemption at issue in cases. 2 7 In these types of cas-
es, the threshold requirement for preemption is that the state law "frus-
trate [the] imperative of enforceability" of the federal legislation.28
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 ("Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is com-
pelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly con-
tained in its structure and purpose. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at
least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it, and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 435 (3d
ed. 2009).
19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 435.
20. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
21. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 546 n.17.
22. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1913) (evaluating conflict between the Federal
food and drugs act and state statute regulating labeling consumer goods).
24. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at
436.
25. Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court,
89 NEB. L. REV. 682,684-685 (2011).
26. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397-98; Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2011).
27. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398.
28. Aragaki, supra note 26, at 1242 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008)).
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Although the power to preempt state laws is constitutionally author-
ized,2 9 the Court typically construes the preemptory effect of federal laws
in light of the Unites States' federalist foundation, such that "in subject
matter areas 'traditionally occupied' by the states, the Court applies a
presumption against preemption." 30 The Supreme Court expounded upon
this concept by explaining that because preemption is an "extraordinary
power in a federalist system," Congress must make its intention to "alter
the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment . .. unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.",3  Thus,
the doctrine of preemption attempts to strike a balance between the uni-
formity of laws on a national scale 3 2 and the preservation of the States'
right to serve as "laboratories"33 for experimentation with respect to so-
cial and economic policy.34
B. Federal Arbitration Act
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 "in response to widespread judi-
cial hostility to arbitration agreements." 3 5 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the FAA was fundamentally designed to "overcome courts'
refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate,"36 and has described Section
2 as reflecting a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."3 7 Although
the Court's interpretation of the FAA's reach has changed since its en-
actment,38 the modem reading allows its application in state courts, 39
29. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
30. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); see also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) ("Where ... the field which Congress
is said to have pre-empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, con-
gressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
31. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1984)).
32. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795,
799-800 (1996) (discussing the conflicting objectives of not "disrupting the existing balance of
federal-state powers" and facilitating "one set of rules in the relevant field").
33. This quote is a reference to Justice Brandies's dicta in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
34. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (2004.
35. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
36. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
37. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
38. See Aaron-Andrew P. BruhI, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution ofFederal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1427-32 (2008).
39. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1984) (choosing not to confine the appli-
cation of the FAA to federal courts).
750 [Vol. 89:3
2012] AT&T MOBILITY L.L. C. V CONCEPCION 75t
extends its scope to the equivalent of Congress's Commerce Clause
power,4 0 and permits its use in statutory causes of action.4 1
The general rule created by Section 2 of the FAA is that courts must
place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and
enforce them according to their terms.42 The saving clause at the end of
Section 2 provides the mechanism under which state laws and rules may
be upheld against challenges under the FAA, contingent upon these laws
and rules being based on "generally applicable contract defenses."4 Alt-
hough the plain language of Section 2 allows for the invalidation of an
arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," the Supreme Court has rarely utilized the
exception," the presumption against preemption 4 5 notwithstanding.
As the Supreme Court established in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, "[t]he FAA
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congres-
sional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." 4 6 Accordingly,
conflict preemption was the only ground on which the Court could find
that the FAA invalidated state laws addressing arbitration.4 7 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted the FAA's preemptive power as ansing un-
der the obstacle subsection of conflict preemption,48 stating in Volt that
state laws found to "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA" would
be preempted.49
40. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268-70 (explaining that the FAA extends to the current reach of
the Commerce Clause power).
41. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-84 (1989).
42. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
43. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
44. Cornpare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (holding California's Discover Bank rule was
preempted by the FAA), and Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688 (holding the Montana statute was
preempted by the FAA), and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding the California
Labor Code was preempted by the FAA), and Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (holding the California
Franchise Investment Law was preempted by the FAA), with Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-79 (holding the
FAA did not preempt the California Law).
45. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
46. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
47. See id; supra Part LA and accompanying notes 14-28; see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal
Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2011).
48. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2250, 2253 (2002) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 477); see also
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 396-98 (noting the different categories of preemption analysis, including
"obstacle" conflict preemption).
49. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78 (framing the issue presented in that case and quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), as creating the authority to exercise obstacle preemption over
state laws).
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While the Supreme Court has recognized that determining congres-
sional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of the preemption doctrine,o
many commentators have noted that the language and the legislative his-
tory of the FAA lack the requisite preemptive intent to invalidate state
arbitration laws."
C. Southland Corp. v. Keating5
The Supreme Court first applied the FAA to preempt a state law
that undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements in Southland
Corp. v. Keating.5' In Southland, several franchisees sued the Southland
Corporation in state court, "alleging, among other things, fraud, oral mis-
representation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation
of the disclosure requirements of California's Franchise Investment Law
(FL)."54 After the individual cases were consolidated, Southland Corpo-
ration filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause
in the franchise agreements.55 The trial court granted Southland's motion
to compel arbitration on all claims except those based on the FL.56 The
court of appeals reversed, allowing arbitration on the FL claim; howev-
er, this ruling was subsequently overturned by the California Supreme
Court, which held that the FIL "require[d] judicial consideration of
claims" and furthermore, that the statute was not preempted by the
FAA.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme
Court, holding that the California law was preempted because it stood as
an obstacle to accomplishing Congress's objectives in enacting the
FAA.58 Specifically, the Court explained that upholding the California
Supreme Court's holding would create a situation in which the right to
50. See Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); see
also Schwartz, supra note 34, at 16.
51. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 34, at 23-27; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,
641-44, 49 (arguing that Congress did not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties or
to enforce arbitration agreements against ignorant consumers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral
Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952-53 (1996)
(referring to the Supreme Court's expansion of FAA jurisprudence as a "slight-of-hand" [sic]). But
see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 112-14 (2002) (arguing that the Southland
Court reached the correct conclusion about the FAA's legislative history).
52. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
53. Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepti-
cism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 477, 485 (2009) (arguing that "since the Supreme Court's 1984 deci-
sion in Southland v. Keating, the FAA's substantive application in state courts and preemption of
state laws undercutting the enforceability of arbitration agreements has been accepted").
54. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 4 (1984). California's Franchise Investment Law
is codified at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000--31516 (West 2011).
55. Southland, 465 U.S. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 10.
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enforce an arbitration contract was dependent on the particular forum in
which the case was brought.59 The Court opined that in drafting the FAA,
"Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements."6 o
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued
that the saving clause in Section 2 allows for the revocation of arbitration
agreements on any grounds that are sufficient to revoke a contract at
common law.61 Therefore, Justice Stevens argued, the FAA should not
preempt the FIL because the waiver was based on public policy, which
forms a sufficient basis for the revocation of a contract at common law.62
Justice O'Connor's dissent proposed an alternative rationale for not
preempting the California law, asserting that Congress's intent was to
create "a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts."63 Based
on this assertion, Justice O'Connor articulated that Section 2 "should
have no application whatsoever in state courts," thereby eliminating the
FAA's authority to preempt state law in state courts.6
D. Perry v. Thomas65
Preemption under the FAA next arose in Perry v. Thomas, which
involved Section 229 of California's Labor code, requiring that litigants
be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.66 The Supreme
Court held that the California statute was in "unmistakable conflict" with
Section 2 of the FAA, and that therefore, "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause,
the state statute must give way." 67
Again, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor dissented, 68 mirroring
the arguments presented in their dissenting opinions in Southland.69 Alt-
hough the majority made a passing reference to the availability of gen-
eral contract defenses to arbitration clauses, it made no attempt to apply
this assertion to the public policy argument advanced by Justice Ste-
vens.70 The majority opinion merely noted that courts "may not rely on
the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
59. Id at 15.
60. Id
61. Id at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 25, 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 31.
65. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
66. Id at 491; CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2011).
67. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491.
68. Id at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 19-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Southland, 465 U.S. at 25, 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 491-92 (majority opinion).
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holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable
the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot." 7 1
E. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto7 2
In Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, the Supreme Court held that
the FAA preempted73 a Montana statute that invalidated arbitration
clauses unless they were types in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract.74 The holding was predicated on the idea that
"[c]ourts may not . .. invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions" because Section 2 requires that
arbitration clauses be afforded the same authority as other contracts.
The Court reasoned that the Montana statute "condition[ed] the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements on [their] compliance with a special
notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally," and therefore,
the statute must be preempted.
Justice Thomas dissented based on his "view that [Section] 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state courts," 77
the same rationale presented by Justice O'Connor in Southland and Per-
ry 
78
F. Discover Bank v. Superior Court7 9
Although Discover Bank v. Superior Court was not heard by the
Supreme Court, it presented a unique challenge to the FAA insofar as it
created a judicial framework allowing California courts to treat arbitra-
tion agreements containing class arbitration waivers differently from
other contracts.80 The case involved a challenge by a credit card holder
who sought class arbitration despite language in the arbitration agree-
ment that forbade it. 1 The Supreme Court of California held that when a
consumer alleges that a class action waiver in a consumer contract has
the effect of exculpating a party with superior bargaining power, the con-
tract is unconscionable and unenforceable. 8 2 The rule created by Discov-
71. Id. at 492 n.9.
72. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
73. Id. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (section (4) repealed 1997)).
74. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
75. Id. at 687 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
78. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Perry,
482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011).
80. Lampley, supra note 53, at 485-86.
81. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103.
82. Id. at I110 ("We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily unconscionable.
But when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is al-
leged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
754 [Vol. 89:3
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er Bank was a key element in the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T
Mobility L.L. C. v. Concepcion.83
II. AT&T MOBILITY L.L.C. V. CONCEPCION
A. Facts
In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion contracted with Cingular
Wireless, which was subsequently purchased by AT&T,8 4 for the pur-
chase of cellular telephones and service. The contract included an arbi-
tration clause that "required ... claims to be brought in the parties' indi-
vidual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported
class or representative proceeding."8 6 The Concepcions purchased the
AT&T cellular service, and although the telephones were advertised as
free, the Concepcions were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the
phones' retail value.87
B. Procedural History
The Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging that
AT&T had "engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax
on phones it advertised as free."88 The complaint was consolidated with a
putative class action based on the same claims. 9
In 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the
agreement; however, the Concepcions opposed the motion, arguing "that
the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpato-
ry under California law because it disallowed classwide [sic] proce-
dures."90 Relying on the rule the California Supreme Court articulated in
Discover Bank, the district court found the arbitration clause unconscion-
able and denied AT&T's motion.91
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding not only that the
Discover Bank rule rendered the arbitration clause unconscionable, but
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent the
obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of
the party 'from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of anoth-
er.' Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should
not be enforced." (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2011))).
83. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
84. AT&T acquired Cingular in November of 2005 and renamed the company AT&T Mobili-
ty in January of 2007. Id. at 1744 n.1; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 n. I (9th
Cir. 2009), rev'd, sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
85. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 & n.1.




90. Id. at 1744-45.
91. Id. at 1745 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005),
abrogatedby Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740).
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that it was not preempted by the FAA because that rule was "simply a
refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts gen-
erally in California." 9 2 The Ninth Circuit further noted that "Discover
Bank placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the ex-
act same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the
context of arbitration."
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that FAA preempts the
Discover Bank rule because "it stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 94
The Court rejected the argument that the Discover Bank rule was
based upon unconscionability, and thereby falls within the saving clause
of Section 2 of the FAA, because "nothing in [Section 2] suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the FAA's objectives." 9 5 The majority further stated that the
"overarching purpose" of the FAA is to ensure agreements are enforced
according to their terms, and because requiring class arbitration funda-
mentally alters arbitration, permitting class proceedings in this case
would be inconsistent with the FAA.96
The majority found that the Discover Bank rule allows parties to a
consumer contract to "demand [class arbitration] ex post," and because
arbitration in this context is mandated by the rule, rather than by agree-
ment of the parties, it is inconsistent with the FAA. 97 Further, the majori-
ty identified three inherent problems with class arbitration.98 First, class
arbitration "sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its infor-
mality-[making] the process slower, more costly," and less likely to
result in final judgment." Second, it requires a level of procedural for-
mality sufficient to bind absent parties to the results. 00 Third, it increases
the risk to defendants because allowing an aggregation of claims increas-
92. Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, sub nom.
AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
93. Id. at 858 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
94. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
95. Id. at 1748.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1750-51.
98. Id at 1751-52.
99. Id. at 1751.
100. Id. ("For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representa-
tives must at all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent members must be
afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class. At least this amount of
process would presumably be required for absent parties to be bound by the results of arbitration."
(citations omitted)).
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es the chance of suffering "a devastating loss," thereby coercing defend-
ants into settling what might otherwise be questionable claims.' 1o
D. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas described his reading of
Section 2 of the FAA, which is based upon the linguistic differences be-
tween the general rule and the saving clause.10 2 Specifically, Justice
Thomas emphasized that although Section 2 requires that arbitration
clauses be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," the saving clause ap-
plies only to "grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."' 03 Justice Thomas concluded that these semantic differ-
ences indicate a congressional intent to apply the saving clause solely to
those "grounds relating to the making of the agreement."'1 Accordingly,
because the Discover Bank rule does not relate to contract formation, it
does not qualify as a basis for revocation pursuant to the saving clause of
Section 2 and is, therefore, preempted by the FAA.1o
E. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, criticized the majority for
preempting California law, and maintained that the Discover Bank rule is
consistent with not only the plain language of the FAA, but its primary
goals as well. 0 6
The dissent argued that the Discover Bank rule was formulated by
the California Supreme Court's interpretation of two provisions of the
California Civil Code,10 7 and that the rule applies to contracts generally,
according to the principle of unconscionability.' 08 Because the rule "ap-
plies equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbi-
tration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in contracts with
such agreements," the rule comports with the saving clause of Section
2-falling directly within the scope of the FAA's exception.109
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the Discover Bank rule is con-
sistent with the purpose of the FAA insofar as it "puts agreements to
arbitrate and agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing.""' 0 Although
the majority asserted that the Discover Bank rule stands as an obstacle to
101. Id. at 1752.
102. Id. at 1753-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 1754 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
104. Id. at 1754-55.
105. Id. at 1755-56.
106. Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1670.5(a), 1668 (West 1985)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1757 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
110. Id. at 1758 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
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the primary objective of the FAA by "discriminating in practice against
arbitration," the dissent argued that this finding is erroneous because
"class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration" and is a form
of arbitration used in California and other jurisdictions."' Because the
language of the Discover Bank rule is consistent with Section 2, and be-
cause the principles of federalism demand that the Court honor the pre-
sumption against preemption, the dissent contended that the Discover
Bank rule should have been upheld.1 12
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's holding in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concep-
cion deserves both commendation and criticism. The Concepcion Court
should be lauded for creating a uniform field of jurisprudence pertaining
to preemption under the FAA. Conversely, the Court's decision warrants
condemnation based on its continuing disregard of federalist principles in
FAA preemption cases. In resolving this dispute, the Court was forced to
evaluate the competing interests that exist at the very core of preemption
under the FAA. By deciding the case as it did, the Court effectively
chose to eschew the concept of consumer fairness and protection in favor
of commercial interests.
A. Leveling the Field ofPreemption Under the FAA
The Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion normalized the statu-
tory and judicially-created laws relating to arbitration and collective ac-
tion waivers across the country, yielding two related benefits: (1) a more
universal framework upon which to guide the decisions of lower courts;
and (2) direction to businesses and individuals responsible for drafting
contracts, allowing these entities to better create enforceable agreements.
The Court's decision in Concepcion to abrogate the Discover Bank
rule created a consistent line of jurisprudence with respect to the preemp-
tion of arbitration clauses under the FAA, dating back to Southland.1 13
Prior to the decision in Concepcion, California, as a result of the Discov-
er Bank rule, remained the only jurisdiction that consistently found col-
lective action waivers in contracts with arbitration agreements substan-
111. Id. at 1758 (citing id at 1747-48 (majority opinion)). The American Arbitration Associa-
tion has described class arbitration to be "a fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class
disputes." Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the dissenting opinion
asserts that the majority's assertion that class arbitration is inconsistent with the goals of the FAA
cannot be traced back to the FAA itself because at the time of its enactment, "arbitration procedures
had not yet been fully developed," so the idea of precluding class arbitration was not yet envisioned.
Id. at 1759.
112. Id. at 1762 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
113. See, e.g., Id. at 1753 (majority opinion) (holding California's Discover Bank rule
preempted by the FAA); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1996) (holding
the Montana statute preempted by the FAA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1987) (hold-
ing the provision of California Labor Law preempted by the FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (holding the California Franchise Investment Law preempted by the FAA).
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tively unconscionable.1 4 This discrepancy was remedied by the Supreme
Court's decision in Concepcion, bringing the prevailing laws in Califor-
nia pertaining to arbitration clauses and class waivers into line with the
laws in the rest of the country."' In addition to creating consistency
among judicial decisions, the Supreme Court eliminated the concern ex-
pressed in Justice Baxter's dissenting opinion in Discover Bank-that
California, because of its minority position on the issue, may be a target-
ed jurisdiction for plaintiffs' lawyers seeking favorable outcomes in this
type of case." 6
By creating consistent precedent across the various states and feder-
al circuits, lower courts are afforded a solid foundation upon which to
base future decisions, thereby reducing the likelihood that their decisions
will be overturned by appellate courts. This benefit was expressed by
Justice O'Connor in Allied-Bruce, in which she stated that her primary
reason for concurring in that decision, despite believing that it was ulti-
mately wrong, "rest[ed] largely on the wisdom of maintaining a uniform
standard.""'7 This notion favoring a uniform application of the law has
also been expressly articulated in other preemption contexts.' 18
Establishing a consistent line of decisions serves an additional pur-
pose-informing those individuals and companies charged with drafting
contracts as to the current state of the law. This benefit was also
acknowledged by Justice O'Connor, stating, "[P]arties have undoubtedly
made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the Act in the
[ten years that have passed between the decisions in Southland and Al-
lied-Bruce]."' 19
A consistent field of FAA preemption jurisprudence provides busi-
nesses operating in multiple states with a more concrete expectation of
the enforceability of their consumer agreements, regardless of the juris-
diction in which the transactions take place. Rather than being compelled
to draft multiple versions of agreements for use across different states, a
company is better positioned to have a single consistent agreement for
114. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 400-01 (2005) (outlining California's minority posi-
tion holding collective arbitration provisions unconscionable).
115. Compare Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated
by AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); with Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc., 517 U.S. at 688-89 (holding the Montana statute preempted by the FAA); and Perry, 482 U.S.
at 491-92 (holding the provision of California Labor Law preempted by the FAA); and Southland,
465 U.S. at 15-16 (holding the California Franchise Investment Law preempted by the FAA).
116. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1118 (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
118. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1376-77 (2006) (discussing the express preemption provision found in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (ERISA provisions
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan")).
119. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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use in all states where it conducts business. The impact of this change on
consumers varies based on one's perspective. On one hand, it increases
the likelihood that consumers will be compelled to arbitrate any dispute
individually, meaning that many potential claims become cost prohibi-
tive-thereby eliciting the exact scenario that the Discover Bank rule was
intended to prevent. 120 In this scenario, consumers who have suffered
only minimal damages cannot likely justify proceeding to arbitration and,
as a result of the lack of financial damages, will likely be unable to find
attorneys willing to assist them. This results in the arbitration provision
operating as a de facto exculpatory clause. 12 1 Alternatively, having the
ability to draft fewer agreements, coupled with more certainty as to the
enforcement of these agreements, results in a reduction of costs to busi-
nesses. In some cases, the reduced costs of drafting and litigating these
agreements could be quite substantial. Theoretically, this should reduce
the gross costs of producing products or rendering services, allowing
companies to offer goods and services to consumers at a lower price
without affecting profitability. In practice, however, it is unlikely that the
majority of businesses would pass this savings on to the consumer.122
B. Another Battle Lost for the Presumption Against Preemption
While, admittedly, there is some inherent benefit to be derived from
having a consistent line of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the violation of
a fundamental principle of federalism is significantly more problematic
to both the judiciary and the country at large.
In the final lines of his dissent, Justice Breyer addressed an im-
portant concept relating to preemption in general, recognizing that the
principles of federalism, upon which this country was founded, dictate
that state laws be given the benefit of the doubt, in the form of a general
120. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (majority opinion).
121. See id. at 1008-10.
122. Much has been written on the topic of the "pass-through" of cost reductions to the end
consumer. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 26, 74 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that
even if cost savings were generated, there was a lack of evidence to indicate that the savings would
accrue to the benefit of consumers). Most frequently this topic arises in the context of mergers and
anti-trust litigation where courts require a showing "that the intended acquisition would result in
significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence,
consumers." F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (1 lth Cir. 1991); see also Jamie
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency
Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1745 (2010) (describing consumer "pass-through" as one of three
factors courts use to determine the evaluate efficiencies of merging entities). This "Passing-On"
requirement exists because of the general belief that businesses are unlikely to pass along savings to
a consumer unless market forces compel them to do so. See Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger
Efficiencies: Reconsidering the "Passing-On" Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 740 (stating
that both proponents and opponents of a passing-on requirement have adopted "a conception of
market conduct in which a firm will 'pocket' merger-specific efficiencies in the form of higher
profits unless competition forces the firm to pass on the efficiencies in the form of lower prices")
(emphasis in original). But see id. at 743-46 (arguing that other factors, including the firm-specific
demand and efficiencies, are more indicative of market price effects).
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presumption against preemption.12 3 Against this backdrop, a review of
the prominent preemption cases, from Southland to Concepcion, reveals
that the decisions could, and arguably should, have been decided in the
alternative.
In Southland, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the FAA
preempted California's Franchise Investment Law (FIL). 124 Interestingly,
only Justice Stevens' concurring and dissenting opinion discussed the
presumption against preemption.125 In his opinion, Justice Stevens argued
that because the language of Section 2 "does not define what grounds for
revocation may be permissible . . . the judiciary must fashion the limita-
tions as a matter of federal common law." 26 Justice Stevens further rea-
soned that the Court should recognize that by including an exception
within Section 2, Congress intended "to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."l27
Justice Stevens contended that the anti-waiver provision in the FL
was justified by a public policy concern, and because public policy pro-
vides grounds for the revocation of a contract at common law, this provi-
sion, when viewed together with a presumption against preemption,
should have prevented the California law from being preempted by the
FAA.128
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent that Con-
gress's intent was to create "a procedural statute, applicable only in fed-
eral courts, [which was] derived ... from the federal power to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts," and as a result, the Court should have
held that the FAA does not apply in state courts.129
Despite having two sufficient bases for not preempting the Califor-
nia law-a narrow justification in public policy and a broader justifica-
tion in the FAA's inapplicability in state courts-the Supreme Court
instead dispensed with the presumption against preemption and held that
the FL violated the Supremacy Clause.' 30 This decision not only in-
fringed upon a "field traditionally occupied by State law,"' 3' thus violat-
123. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." (alteration in original) (citing
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))).
124. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
125. See id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967)).
128. Id at 20-21. The Court applies a presumption against preemption in areas traditionally
occupied by the states, including contract law. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
129. Southland, 465 U.S. at 25, 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 15-16 (majority opinion).
131. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
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ing the principles of federalism, but also influenced each of the subse-
quent cases based on the principle of stare decisis.13 2
In Perry, despite indicating that state law defenses are "available if
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally,"' 33 the Court brushed aside the pub-
lic policy justification for the California labor provision and held the law
preempted by the FAA.134 The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens
and O'Connor again addressed the inappropriateness of applying the
FAA in state court proceedings'35 and outlined a public policy defense-
the desire to prevent employers from forcing employees to waive their
right to bring suit in the court system-that should have protected the
state statute from preemption. 136 Thus, as in Southland, the Supreme
Court was content to disregard the notion of a presumption against the
preemption of state laws despite the existence of valid reasons that would
have allowed the Court to defer to the California courts and legislature.
In light of Montana Supreme Court Justice Trieweiler's concurring
opinion setting forth the "real" reasons for upholding the statute,13 7 in
Doctor's Associates, the Supreme Court was limited in its ability to find
that a Montana statute was not preempted by the FAA. The plaintiffs
argued to the United States Supreme Court that the Montana statute
could be upheld as nondiscriminatory because the statutory notice re-
quirement was merely a state law rule requiring that "[u]nexpected pro-
visions in adhesion contracts must be conspicuous."' 3 8 This interpretation
would be consistent with the FAA because it does not apply only to arbi-
tration agreements, but instead presents a requirement, under state law,
that govern contracts generally. The Court, however, did not address this
argument because the Montana Supreme Court failed to cite any such
132. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
133. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
134. Id. at 491.
135. Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting, O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1459 (citing Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont.
1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring), vacated, sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S.
1129 (1995)). Justice Trieweiler's concurring opinion included the following language:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to
understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration provisions
and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural safe-
guards and substantive laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick
a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and require the par-
ty with inferior bargaining power to sign it. The procedures we have established, and the
laws we have enacted, are either inapplicable or unenforceable in the process we refer to
as arbitration.
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
138. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3.
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general common law doctrine.' 39 Therefore, had Justice Trieweiler not
been so candid in his comments disparaging arbitration and adhesionary
arbitration clauses, this statute might have been upheld as not discrimi-
nating against arbitration, but creating a general requirement that terms
in a contract must comport with the reasonable expectations of the con-
sumer.140
In Concepcion, sufficient grounds existed to find that the FAA did
not preempt the Discover Bank rule, particularly when considered in
conjunction with the underlying presumption against preemption inher-
ent in the federal system. While the majority argued that the rule "treat[s]
arbitration agreements with class arbitration waivers differently from
other contracts, . . . [rendering] any arbitration agreement containing a
class arbitration waiver . . . per se unenforceable,"'41 the Discover Bank
rule is facially based on the common law principle of
unconscionability,14 2 which presents a basis for invalidating contracts
generally, thereby falling within the saving clause of Section 2 of the
FAA.
In isolation, each of the cases outlined in this section had sufficient
grounds upon which to uphold the statute against a challenge of preemp-
tion under the FAA, but when viewed collectively, these cases represent
a clear departure from the presumption against preemption and signify an
infringement upon States' rights as "independent sovereigns in our fed-
eral system."l 43
Throughout the years, many of the Supreme Court Justices have ar-
ticulated misgivings about this line of decisions,'" which Concepcion
now joins. As the author of the original dissenting opinion in South-
land,' 4 5 Justice O'Connor remained highly critical of these decisions
involving preemption under the FAA.146 This criticism included a reitera-
tion of her belief that this line of precedent was "'unfaithful to congres-
sional intent, unnecessary, and in light of the [Act's] antecedents and the
139. Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1460 (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 n.3 (1996)).
140. Id. at 1461-62 (citing Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 69 (Mont. 2002)).
141. Lampley, supra note 53, at 485-86.
142. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
143. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) ("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."
(alteration in original)).
144. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21-36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282-84 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); (Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Perry, 482 U.S. at
494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable . . . 47 Further,
Justice O'Connor stated that "[a]lthough each decision has built logically
upon the decisions preceding it, the initial building block in Southland
laid a faulty foundation."l48 Justice O'Connor also underscored the in-
consistency in the Supreme Court holdings under the FAA, opining that
although Congress may limit or preclude a waiver of a judicial forum,
the Court has never explained why state legislatures should not also have
such power. 14 9 She further recognized that although a litany of Supreme
Court decisions asserted that the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute is
fundamentally a question of congressional intent, "over the past decade,
the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent
with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its
own creation."so Perhaps most striking, however, was her eventual ca-
pitulation, acknowledging that in the ten years following the decision in
Southland, after subsequent cases had built upon its reasoning and "par-
ties [had] undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpre-
tation of the [FAA]," she was "persuaded by considerations of stare
decisis . .. to acquiesce in today's judgment."'5 '
Justice Stevens, who wrote a decision concurring in part and dis-
senting in part in Southland,152 further criticized the holding in his dis-
senting opinion in Perry v. Thomas, stating that through the Court's deci-
sion in Southland, the Supreme Court had, for all intents and purposes,
effectively rewritten the FAA "to give it a pre-emptive scope that Con-
gress certainly did not intend." 53 Justice Stevens further explained that
because the states retain the power to "exempt certain categories of dis-
putes from arbitration" this authority "should be preserved unless Con-
gress decides otherwise. . .. 154
Justice Scalia, although not on the Court at the time Southland was
decided, also asserted that this decision "clearly misconstrued the Federal
Arbitration Act," stating that "[a]dhering to Southland entails a perma-
nent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potential-
ly large class of disputes."' 55 Justice Scalia further explained that in spite
of this belief, he would not dissent from future opinions based on South-
land, but will "stand ready" to overrule the decision should four other
147. Perry, 482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting South-
land, 465 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
148. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Perry, 482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
150. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Id.at283-84.
152. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 494.
155. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justices decide to do so, as "Southland will not become more correct
over time." .
The primary problem with the Concepcion decision is that it relies
upon the faulty interpretation of the FAA's preemptive effect established
in Southland. The Court's categorization of the FAA as a preemptive
substantive law ignores the primary factor in the preemption analysis:
congressional intent.15 7 The FAA and its legislative history are devoid of
reference, either express or implied, to its effect on state law.'s This
reasoning alone should have been sufficient to compel a decision against
any preemptive effect when contemplated against the backdrop of feder-
alism. 159
In addition to the congressional intent problem, the line of decisions
from Southland to Concepcion conflict with the principle of state sover-
eignty inherent in the federalist system.160 This concept, which dates
back to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, was
articulated by the Supreme Court as follows: "The constitutionally man-
dated balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental
liberties.""' The Court's interference with this balance of power infring-
es on States' rights by failing to acknowledge their retention of sovereign
power.162 The idea that the Supreme Court "should not go far out in front
of Congress in discovering national policies in silent statutes when the
effect is such a large-scale intrusion into state autonomy on a matter of
traditional state regulation"l 63 has been violated by the Court's interpre-
tation of FAA preemption in Southland and its progeny.
Beyond its infringement upon traditional state powers, FAA
preemption has also invalidated numerous state laws designed to protect
individual consumers.' 64 The Court's extension of FAA preemption in
156. Id. at 285.
157. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 554-57; Schwartz, supra note 34, at 7-10; see also supra
notes 46-51 and accompanying text. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Revisiting Southland, 10
DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 23, 27-28 (2004).
158. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 8 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1984).
159. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
160. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 571-72.
161. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985)).
162. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring Congress to make its
preemptive intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" so as to "acknowledg[e] that
the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which
Congress does not readily interfere.").
163. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 30.
164. E.g., Miller v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 769 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1343 (D. Utah 2011) (holding
that the FAA preempted portions of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953
§ 13-11-4 in a deceptive trade practice suit); Abela v. General Motors Corp., 669 N.W.2d 271, 278
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the FAA preempted provisions of a motor vehicle lemon law
statute, M.C.L.A. §§ 257.1401-1409, prohibiting waiver of rights and remedies); Estate of Ruszala
ex rel. Mizerak v. Brookdale Living Cmtys., Inc., I A.3d 806, 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
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Concepcion represents a further shift towards the protection of corporate
and commercial interests at the expense of consumer protection.
C. Practical Effects of the Decision
The Concepcion decision will undoubtedly have practical effects on
not only future preemption jurisprudence but also in the drafting of con-
sumer contracts. While the impact that the Concepcion decision will
have on commercial agreements may not be fully appreciated for years to
come, the Court's decision has already influenced a variety of cases
across the nation.
One of the first decisions to apply the Supreme Court's holding
from Concepcion was Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.'65 In this case, the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief and other remedies for claims brought
under the California Unfair Competition Law, California Consumer Le-
gal Remedies Act, California False Advertising Act, and the Federal
Communications Act.166 The defendant moved to compel arbitration and
the plaintiff opposed on the grounds that these claims were not subject to
arbitration as a matter of public policy, 167 citing previous California Su-
preme Court decisions. 16 8 The Supreme Court's holding in Concepcion
compelled the court's decision, stating that the FAA "preempts Califor-
nia's exemption of claims for public injunctive relief from arbitration" in
federal court, "despite public policy arguments thought to be persuasive
in California."169
Although, on its face, the Concepcion decision served only to over-
turn California's Discover Bank rule, some commentators have suggest-
ed that the holding is broad enough to apply nationwide. 170 Because the
Concepcion decision presents a tremendous obstacle to the invalidation
of arbitration and class waivers on the grounds of unconscionability, that
attorneys may focus on alternative grounds upon which to invalidate
arbitration clauses, such as issues of contract formation or contract revo-
cation. In theory, this should provide a legitimate means of invalidating
agreements that contain arbitration clauses because the saving clause of
Section 2 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to treat agreements
(holding that the FAA preempted a prohibition of arbitration provisions in living facilities' contracts
contained in the Nursing Home Responsibilities and Rights of Residents Act, N.J.S.A. 30:13-8.1).
165. No. C 10-05663 WHA, 2011 WL 1842712, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id at * 1-2.
168. Id. at *1 (citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 75-76 (1999)
(holding that claims for public injunctive relief brought under the CLRA are not subject to arbitra-
tion); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (2003) (holding that claims for public
injunctive relief brought under the UCL are not subject to arbitration)).
169. Arellano, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2.
170. E.g., Stephen G. Harvey & Angelo A. Stio, Ill, Supreme Court Upholds Class Action
Waiver Provisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP CLASS ACTION
CLIENT ALERT (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications-article.aspx?ArticleKey-
2094.
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containing arbitration clauses "upon the same footing" as those without
such provisions.' 7' Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the
Court's efforts "to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so."l72
Concepcion will also likely have a far-reaching impact on the draft-
ing of contracts. With the elimination of what at least one commentator
has argued is the principal means by which to invalidate arbitration
clauses,"' businesses will undoubtedly be encouraged to incorporate
arbitration provisions into a greater number and broader range of con-
tracts.174 These include not only a wider breadth of consumer service and
product contracts, but potentially into employment agreements as well.175
Moreover, while the arbitration agreement in Concepcion had many
consumer-friendly provisions, 76 in light of this decision, the motivation
for businesses to include such terms is severely diminished if not elimi-
nated altogether. The inclusion of the favorable terms in the AT&T
agreement was likely done in an effort to directly combat any potential
allegation that the inclusion of an arbitration clause was substantively
unconscionable. In fact, the district court specifically noted the favorable
consumer treatment in this agreement, stating that the dispute resolution
mechanism found in this agreement was "quick, easy to use, and prompts
full or ... even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbi-
trate or litigate."'n7 With the unconscionability loopholel 78 now closed,
companies drafting consumer agreements are no longer incentivized to
include such consumer-friendly terms in their agreements because the
need to combat unconscionability was effectively eradicated by the Con-
cepcion Court.
171. E.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989).
172. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
173. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1436-37.
174. Jeffrey M. Judd, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion-Supreme Court Enforces Class Action
Waiver, JUDD LAW GROUP PUBLICATIONS/TALKS (May 11, 2011),
http://juddlawgroup.com/supreme-court-enforces-class-action-waiver/.
175. Id.
176. The agreement provided that a consumer may initiate a dispute by completing a form on
AT&T's website. AT&T then had the option to settle any claim presented. If the claim proceeded to
arbitration, AT&T was required to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims. For claims of $10,000 or
less, arbitration could be conducted in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions. AT&T
was precluded from recovering attorney's fees and in the event that a customer received an arbitra-
tion award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T was required to pay a $7,500
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (majority opinion).
177. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, *ll (S.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2008), rev'd
sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
178. See Bruhl supra note 38, at 1436 (describing unconscionability as an "outlet" for "court[s]
wishing to strike back against arbitration"); Lampley supra note 53, at 489-91 (characterizing
unconscionability as the "defense of choice" in cases contesting the validity of arbitration clauses).
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D. Potential Cures
Should the Court decide to reconsider its decision in Concepcion
and seek a greater balance between commercial interest and consumer
fairness, the current line of jurisprudence may limit its ability to do so.
One such method would be for the Supreme Court to overturn the
line of decisions dating back to Southland. Currently, none of the Justic-
es who comprised the majority in Southland remain on the Supreme
Court. More importantly, six of the nine current Justices have, at some
point, expressed displeasure with or misgivings about this line of deci-
sions.17 9 While this solution is not impossible, it is improbable given the
Concepcion decision and established jurisprudence.180 There have been
numerous opportunities over the past twenty-seven years to overturn
Southland, and even with a collection of prominent legal scholars advo-
cating for this course of action,'81 the Supreme Court has declined to do
So.
A more direct approach to remedying the effect of the Concepcion
decision on both the consumer and States' rights could come in the form
of a legislative solution. Clearly, the most direct and certain way to effect
change in this area would be though a congressional amendment of the
FAA. By amending the saving clause to reflect a more clearly defined
exception to the general application of FAA principles, Congress could
provide more detailed direction to the Supreme Court as to the intended
scope of the FAA and any potential exceptions to its provisions.
The process of amending the FAA may have already begun. The
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011182 seeks to amend the FAA to
restrict the enforceability of arbitration clauses in employment, consum-
179. Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opinion in Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756-62
(Breyer, J. dissenting), which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Thomas
authored dissenting opinions in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996)
(Thomas, J. dissenting), and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285-97(1995)
(Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's dissent and authored a separate
dissenting opinion in Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
180. The inertia of the line of decisions from Southland to Concepcion, coupled with the Su-
preme Court's general reluctance to overturn cases render this potential solution highly unlikely. See
Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1057,
1102 (2002) ("Unless we are to assume that a majority of the Supreme Court only disagrees with
two cases a year on average, which seems highly implausible, the rate of overrulings suggests a
general reluctance to overturn precedent."); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
181. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02-634), 2003 WL 1701513; see also Drahozal, supra
note 157, at 23.
182. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). This legislation was origi-
nally presented in 2007 and was recently reintroduced by Senator Al Franken.
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er, and civil rights cases.' 83 This legislation, according to Senator Frank-
en, is aimed at rectifying the Court's decision in Concepcion.184
Alternatively, there is another recent legislative development that
could have a significant effect upon the landscape of FAA preemption.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 85
contains a directive that requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau to "conduct a study of, and . .. provide a report to Congress con-
cerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of any future
dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection with the
offering or providing of consumer financial products or services." 8 The
statute also provides the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the
authority to enact regulations that prohibit or limit the use of arbitration
provisions for the protection of consumers if the prohibitions or limita-
tions serve the public interest.'8 It remains to be seen, however, if the
Supreme Court would find any such regulations enacted by the Consum-
er Financial Protection Bureau to be in conflict with the FAA.' Given
the Supreme Court's current interpretation of FAA preemption, the
Dodd-Frank legislation may not be able to affect this jurisprudence
without an amendment to the FAA itself.
CONCLUSION
Although the holding in Concepcion is consistent with the holdings
in Southland, Perry, and Doctor's Associates, these decisions collective-
ly demonstrate a departure from one of the core values outlined by the
nation's founders: an inherent deference to States' rights in the form of a
presumption against preemption. By holding that the FAA preempted the
Discover Bank rule, the Supreme Court wrongly decided AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion and, in doing so, continued down a path which
ultimately deviates from the fundamental principles of federalism em-
bodied in the preemption doctrine.
Kristopher Kleiner*
183. Ashley Cummings, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That
the FAA Preempts State Court Rule Finding Class Waivers in Arbitration Contracts Unconsciona-
ble, THE LITIGATOR SECTION, ATLANTABAR.ORG (May 2011), http://www.atlantabar.org
/associations/6890/files/Article%202 ConcepcionArticle.pdf
184. Id.
185. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
186. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5518(a) (2010).
187. §5518(b).
188. Cummings, supra note 183.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013. 1 would like to thank the Denver University Law Review Board and
staff along with Professor Alan Chen for their assistance in developing this comment.
7692012]

